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In 2005, the EU introduced an emissions trading system in order to pursue its Kyoto 
obligations. This instrument gives emitters the flexibility to undertake reduction measures 
in the most cost-efficient way and mobilizes market forces for the protection of the 
earth’s climate. In this paper, we analyse the effects of emissions trading in Europe, with 
some special reference to the case of Germany. We look at the value of the flexibility 
gained by trading compared to fixed quotas. The analysis will be undertaken with a 
modified version of the GTAP-E model using the latest GTAP version 6 data base. It is 
based on the national allocation plans as submitted to and approved by the EU. We find 
that, if the NAP is combined with a regional emissions trading scheme, then Germany, 
Great Britain, and Czech Republic are the main sellers of emissions permits, while 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are the main buyers. The welfare gains from 
regional emissions trading – for the trading sectors only - are largest for Belgium, 
Denmark, and Great Britain; smaller for Finland, Sweden, and smallest for Germany and 
other regions. When we take into account the economy-wide and terms of trade effects of 
emissions trading, however, the (negative) terms of trade effects can offset the (positive) 
allocative efficiency gains for the cases of the Netherland and Italy, while all other 
regions ended up with positive net welfare gains. All regions, however, experienced 
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Introduction  
 
The European Union considers climate change as “one of the greatest environmental, 
social and economic threats facing the planet.” It therefore took a leading role in the 
negotiations for international action against climate change, in particular for the Kyoto 
Protocol. In order to set an example, it accepted relatively ambitious targets. Whereas all 
Annex B countries were to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases by about 5 percent, 
the EU has committed to an 8 percent reduction.  
Compliance with this target, however, does not come easily for the EU. Figure 1 depicts 
the development of the emissions of CO2 and  of all greenhouse gases (GHGs). It shows 
that the emissions in the EU were reduced quite effectively in the first half of the 90s. 
This was to a large extent due to the massive breakdown and modernisation of the 
industry in the former East Germany. Emissions have been fluctuating since then and 
increasing since the end of the 1990s (EEA 2005). 
 




Source: EEA 2005 
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Therefore, in 2000 the EU Commission launched the European Climate Change 
Programme (ECCP), a continuous multi-stakeholder consultative process which serves to 
identify cost-effective ways for the EU to meet its Kyoto commitments, to set priorities 
for action and to implement concrete measures.
1 One of the main elements of this 
program was the establishment of a European CO2 emissions trading scheme. The EU 
considers this as “a cornerstone in the fight against climate change” which will help its 
Member States to achieve compliance with their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol 
and the EU burden sharing at lower costs. The basic idea of emissions trading is to limit 
the amount of some kind of emission by creating rights to emit a certain amount of a gas 
and to make these rights – which are called allowances  – tradable. The scarcity of 
emission allowances gives them a market value and thus a positive price which increases 
the costs for emitters. This creates an incentive to reduce emissions in an efficient way. 
Those emitters whose avoidance costs are lower than the market price of allowances will 
reduce their emissions and buy less certificates or sell excess emissions rights and vice 
versa. 
Emissions trading has been introduced to international climate change policy through the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, there is a fundamental difference between the two approaches: 
The Kyoto Protocol permits trading between the Parties to the protocol on the level of 
states, the EU ETS comprises 11,428 installations and involves trade among individual 
emitters in 25 Member States.  
In this paper we analyse the effects of the European Emissions Trading System (ETS), in 
particular the cost reduction that may be obtained by the flexibility of trading. This will 
be done by comparing three scenarios where the same reduction target is achieved with 
different degrees of flexibility. In the first case (Experiment 1), fixed quotas do not permit 
any flexibility at all. The second scenario (Experiment 2) allows trading between the 
sectors within the national economy. The third scenario (Experiment 3) represents the EU 
ETS where all participating European emitters can trade emission allowances among each 
other.  
                                                 
1 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on EU policies and 
measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: Towards a European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), 
Com(2000)88 final.   4
European Emissions Trading  
 
The ETS started on 1 January 2005. The first trading period – which has been nick-named 
“warm up phase” or “learning phase” – covers the years 2005 to 2007. The second phase 
corresponds to the Kyoto period 2008 to 2012.  
The framework for European Emissions Trading has been defined by a Directive in 
October 2003
2 which lines out the basic features of the system, but leaves substantial 
scope for the Member States to decide on important aspects of the implementation. The 
most important features set by the EU are the following:
3 
•  The European ETS will be a cap-and-trade system, i.e. the absolute quantity of 
emission rights (rather than relative or specific emissions) will be fixed at the 
beginning.  
•  Only one of the six greenhouse gases of the Kyoto Protocol will be subject to the 
ETS, at least during the first period from 2005 to 2007. The main reason for this is 
that CO2 is the greenhouse gas which is easiest to monitor, since the emissions are 
directly related to the use of fossil fuels for which most countries have already 
established a monitoring system in order to levy energy taxes.  
•  In order to limit the administrative costs of the ETS, the system will be restricted to 
large installations. Therefore, only installations belonging to one of four broad sectors 
which are listed in the Directive and which exceed a sector-specific threshold are 
subject to emissions trading. The four sectors are  
-  Energy activities (such as, electric power, direct emissions from oil refineries) 
-  Production and processing of ferrous metals  (iron and steel),  
-  Mineral industry (such as cement, glass, or ceramic production),  
-  pulp and paper.  
The thresholds refer to the production capacity of the installation, e.g. in the case of 
combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW. The Emissions 
Trading Scheme will cover around 45 % of the EU’s total CO2 emissions or about 30 
% of its overall greenhouse gas emissions. This partial coverage of the ETS is likely 
to produce inefficiencies. This can only be avoided if the total quantities of 
allowances are set at level which equalises the marginal avoidance costs between the 
emissions trading sector and other emitters.  
                                                 
2 “Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council 
Directive 96/61/EC,” Official Journal of the European Union, L 275/32, 25.10.2003. 
3 For a more detailed description and good discussions of the ETS see Kruger / Pizer (2004).   5
•  At least 95% of the total quantity of allowances must be issued for free in the 2005/07 
period, at least 90% in 2008/12. 
•  Allowances are issued by each Member State, but trading can take place between any 
EU participant. 
•  The so-called “linking Directive” will allow participants in emissions trading to count 
credits from emission reduction projects around the world towards their obligations 
under the European Union's emissions trading scheme. Thus the project-based 
mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol (“Clean Development Mechanism" and "Joint 
Implementation") will be available for European business, even if the protocol did not 
enter into force. 
Within this framework, the Member States have three important tasks. First, they have to 
decide which quantity of emissions should be allocated to the installations participating in 
the ETS. This decision must take into consideration the burden sharing target of the 
country and must list the policies and measures which are to be applied in the sectors 
which are not part of the ETS. However, in almost all countries business representatives 
made strong lobbying efforts to make sure that emissions trading will not impair their 
competitive position. This led to very generous allocations in some cases.  Second, they 
have to draw up a list of all installations which are subject to emissions trading. Third, 
they have to decide how to allocate the total quantity to individual installations. The 
Directive sets some general rules according to which the allocation has to be made, but 
there is substantial scope for national priorities.  
These decisions have to be written down in a “National Allocation Plan” (NAP) which 
was supposed to be notified to the Commission by the end of March 2004, in the case of 
the new Member States by the end of June 2004 for review and approval. On 20 June 
2005, the EU accepted the last NAP.  
 
The National Allocation Plan (NAP) in Germany 
 
Germany’s National Allocation Plan consists of two elements: the so-called Macroplan 
which defines the national emissions budget and determines the total quantity of 
allowances to be allocated and a Microplan for the intended allocation of allowances to   6
operators of individual installations (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (2004) and Bundesregierung (2004)).
4 
The starting point of the Macroplan is Germany’s commitment of the Kyoto protocol 
and the European burden sharing agreement to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases 
by 21 % by 2008 to 2012 compared to 1990 levels. Up to now a 19 % reduction has been 
achieved already. Taking into account the projected development of non-CO2 emissions, 
the German Government fixed the CO2 target for the period 2005 to 2007 at 859 mill. 
tons – only 0,5 % less than 2000-2002 amounting to 863 mill. tons. Within these limits, 
the total quantity of allowances allocated to the trading sector are 499 mill. tons of CO2, 
compared to 501 mill. tons in 2000-2002. This corresponds to a reduction of 0.4% and 
gives the trading sectors a comfortable position.  
In the non-trading sectors, the CO2 emissions have to be reduced from 362 mill. tons in 
2000/2002 to 360 mill tons in 2005/2007. This also seems to be only a small reduction. 
But considering the fact, that the temperature adjusted emissions in 2000/2002 add up to 
approximately 373 mill. tons, the reduction rate (3,5 %) will be much higher than the rate 
for the trading sectors.
5  
The Microplan gives information on the intended allocation of allowances to operators 
of individual installations.
6 This allocation has been guided by the following basic 
principles:  
•  For existing installations (incumbents), the allowances allocated will be based on 
historical emissions in the reference period 2000-2002 (Grandfathering).  
•  New installations will be allocated free of charge if they do not receive such a transfer 
(New entrant rule). A reserve of 3 Mt CO2 is set aside for this purpose. 
•  Allowances from installations which have been decommissioned can be transferred 
for four years to installations or extensions to installations commissioned from 1 
January 2005 (Transfer rule). 
Furthermore, several special rules relating to early action, process-related emissions as 
well as for combined heat and power generation and a hardship clause have been 
                                                 
4 Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature conservation and Nuclear Safety: National Allocation Plan 
for the Federal Republic of Germany 2005-2007. Berlin, 31 March 2004.  
5 In contrast to the obligations given by the EU directive, no clear information is given in the German NAP 
which policies and measures will be implemented to guarantee that these targets will be achieved. 
6 In total 1849 installations participate in the emissions trading system in Germany.   7
designed to take account of special circumstances which according to the EU Directive 
may justify a more generous treatment. 
In order to reconcile the Macroplan with the Microplan, a so-called compliance factors 
need to be applied. Since the trading sectors are to reduce emissions by 0,4%, a factor of 
0.996 is applied to all allocations based on historical emissions. Since special rules 
increase the allocation to some installation and a reserve for newcomers is to be set aside, 
the allocation to other installation must be reduced by an additional compliance factor. 
The effective reduction varies between 0 % and 7.5 %.  
All in all the German NAP – as well as many of the NAP in other European countries – 
seems to be not very ambitious, especially concerning the allowances given to the trading 
sectors, and not very clear in respect of the non-trading sectors. Nevertheless, special 
rules for many installations lead to relatively large reductions for others and potentially 
large cost differences. This creates ample scope for efficiency gains through trading.  
 
Quantitative Impact assessment 
 
Model, Data, and Experiments Description 
 
In this study we use a version of the GTAP-E model (Burniaux and Truong, 2002) which 
is based on the latest version 6.2 of the standard GTAP model (Hertel, 1997). The model 
uses version 6 of the GTAP data base which consists of 57 commodities/sectors and 87 
regions including the 25 European Member states (Dimaranan and McDougall, 
forthcoming). For the purpose of this study, we use an aggregation which includes most 
of the EU member states
7 and all of the ‘allocated’ sectors (see Tables 1 and 2). The 
projected percentage changes in CO2 emissions for the various sectors for the period 
2005-07 to satisfy the NAP are as shown in Table 3. 
First, we notice that if we adhere strictly to the NAP, then some shocks to the emissions 
would be positive (shaded areas). A positive emission shock would imply no abatement 
effort is involved, and furthermore, a negative abatement cost may result, which does not 
make sense in practice. Therefore, to avoid this situation, we have chosen to swap a 
positive emissions shock with a zero shock for the marginal abatement cost (i.e. zero 
carbon tax) and let the emissions levels be determined endogenously by the model. The 
                                                 
7 Except for those states with small allocations which are then aggregated into a single “rest of European 
Union” (REU) region (see Table 1).   8
resulting emissions will then be positive but often would be less than the actual NAP 
allocations (see Table 4). 
Next, for non-NAP sectors (i.e. sectors which are not part of the NAP), we assume that 
there will be no abatement cost (zero carbon tax) imposed on these sectors, hence, their 
emissions levels will be determined endogenously by the model, according to the 
production and relative price relationship between these sectors and other NAP sectors.  
In general, we will expect a positive increase in emissions rather than a reduction in 
emissions for these non-NAP sectors, which means a ‘leakage’ of emissions from NAP to 
non-NAP sectors.  
We carry out three experiments. In Experiment 1 (“No Trading”), we shock the emissions 
of each designated sector of each region by the projected percentage changes to satisfy 
the NAP requirement, and let the model estimate the required carbon price (marginal 
abatement cost). In Experiment 2 (“Domestic Emissions Trading” only), we allow all 
designated sectors of each region with a NAP allocation to trade in emissions with each 
other. This will result in a uniform MAC across all trading sectors for each region but the 
MAC will be different for different regions. In Experiment 3 (“Regional Emissions 
Trading”), we allow not only domestic trading, but also trading between regions (EU 
member states). This will result in a uniform MAC across all NAP sectors and regions. 
The changes in MACs between the three experiments are used to measure the potential 
gains (reduction in MAC) that can result from either domestic trading, or from domestic 
plus regional trading. The results of the experiments are shown in Tables 4-14. All costs 
are reported in 1995US$. 
   9

























Table 1 Categorisation of Regions/Countries 














cze Czech  Republic 
hun Hungary 
pol Poland   
REU  Rest of European Union  
CHIND  China and India 
JPN   Japan 
USA United  States 




Value-Added  Intermediate 
Land  Labour  KE 









Table 2 Categorisation of Sectors 
   Description 
Coal  Coal Mining 
Oil  Crude Oil 
Gas Natural  Gas  Extraction 
Electricity Electricity 
Oil_Pcts  Refined Oil Products 
Metals Metals  products 
Min_Prod Mineral  Products 
Paper Paper 
Motor_Equip  Motor machine & equipment 
Constr Construction 
Textile Textile 
Oth_Ind Other  Industries 
ROE  Rest of the economy 
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Table 3  Percentage deviation of emissions from projected level for period 2005-2007 







Pcts  Metals 
Min_ 
Prod  Paper 
Motor_
Equip  Constr Textile 
Oth_ 
Ind  ROE 
aut  -8.9 -7.9 -3.5 -4.3 -3.6 -4.9 -4.6 -5.9     
bel  -27.4 -5.3 -5.3 -5.3 -5.3 -5.3 -5.3 -5.3 -5.3   
dnk  -26.2 -7.1 -7.1 -7.1 -7.1 -7.1 -7.1 -7.1 -7.1   
fin  -12.5                   
fra  -0.4 -2.8  -10.3 -8.1             
deu  -3.1 -2.6 -0.5 -0.4  -1 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2   
grc  -6.5 -16.8      -6.6           
gbr  -8.7 -0.9  -18.4 -5.7 -3.3 -3.3 -2.9 -2.5     
ita  -5.5    -4.2 -1.7 -3.4           
nld  -7.8 -7.8 -7.8 -7.8 -7.8 -7.8 -7.8 -7.8 -7.8   
prt  -6.2      -1.2             
esp  -6.5 -3.6 -2.9 -5.4 -4.5           
swe  -13.9 -13.9 -13.9 -13.9 -13.9 -13.9 -13.9 -13.9 -13.9   
cze  -4.5 -4.3 -4.6 -4.5 -4.1           
hun  -3.1 -5.1 -5.1 -5.1 -5.1           
pol  -9.3 -3.8  -10.3  -2 -7.5           
(*) (Allocated emissions – Projected Emissions)/(Projected Emissions) * 100 
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Results 
Table 4 shows the percentage change in emissions for all sectors and regions in 
Experiment 1. For the sectors subjected to the NAP, these are the same as in Table 3 (i.e. 
negative) except for those sectors with positive emissions changes according to the NAP 
constraints which have been replaced with a zero MAC constraint. For these sectors, as 
well as all other non-NAP sectors which are subject to a zero MAC constraint, the 
estimated changes in emissions can be positive, which implies a ‘leakage’ from NAP to 
non-NAP sectors. Table 5 shows the estimated MACs for the NAP sectors in the case of 
no emissions trading (Experiment 1). These estimated MACs can range from a very low 
figure of less than a dollar per ton of CO2 ($/tCO2) for some sectors, to a high figure of 
163 ($/tCO2) for the Oil Refining (Oil_Pcts) sector in Sweden (swe). The high figures of 
the MACs in the Oil Refining sector reflects the fact that there is limited capacity for fuel 
substitution or fuel efficiency improvement in this sector (as compared to other sectors 
such as electricity generation). 
Table 6 and Table 7 show the percentage change in emissions relative to the baseline, and 
the MAC, for all sectors and regions in Experiment 2 where there is emissions trading 
between the sectors but no emissions trading between the regions. The MACs in this case 
are now uniform for a given region but varies across different regions. It can range from a 
low figure of less than 1$/tCO2 for Great Britain (gbr) to a high figure of 8.4 $/tCO2 for 
the case of Sweden (swe). 
Table 8 shows the changes in emissions levels from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2. 
Sectors with positive increases in emissions from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2 represent 
‘buying sectors’, which buy the ‘permit’ for the extra emissions from those sectors with 
negative changes in emissions. The ‘buying sectors’ are those with high MACs, who will 
rather buy more permits to increase their emissions rathe rathan incur high MAC to 
reduce their emissions (as required under the NAP). The reverse is true for the sectors 
with low MACs. Both, however, will end up with positive efficiency gains. These   
efficiency gains are calculated as (approximately) 0.5 x (Change in emissions) x (Change 
in MAC), where the changes in emissions and in MAC will often be opposite in 
directions as explained above (except for the cases where the output effect may dominate 
the price or substitution effect). The efficiency gains when moving from ‘No Trading’ to 
‘Domestic Sectoral Trading’ are given in Table 9. From Table 9, it is seen that the regions 
that gain the most from domestic emissions trading are Greece (grc) followed by the   13
Netherland (nld), Sweden (swe), then France (frc) and Great Britain (gbr). Germany (deu) 
and Spain (esp) only gain moderately.  
Tables 10 and 11 show the percentage changes in emissions relative to the baseline, and 
the MAC, for all sectors and regions in Experiment 3 where there are emissions trading 
not only between the sectors but also between regions. The MAC in this case (2 $/tC) is 
now uniform not only for all NAP sectors but also for all trading regions. Table 12 shows 
the changes in emissions levels from Experiment 2 to Experiment 3. Regions with 
positive increases in emissions from Experiment 2 to Experiment 3 (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, The Netherland, Spain, Sweden, Poland) represent 
regions which buy emission permits from those regions with negative changes in 
emissions (Germany, Great Britain, Czech Republic, Hungary). The ‘buying regions’ are 
those regions with higher MACs as compared to the ‘selling regions’. All regions, 
however, will gain in efficiency when trading in emissions. Table 13 shows these gains. 
The gains are generally smaller than the those from sectoral trading alone (Table 9), 
which implies that the differences in MACs between the sectors within a region are 
generally greater than the differences in MACs across different regions. The gains are 
also largest for Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, Finland, and Sweden, which reflect the 
greater variations in MACs between these regions.  
Finally, Table 14 shows the overall macroecoomic effects of emissions trading. Firstly, 
compared to the case of no trading, emissions trading (across sectors as well as across 
regions) will bring about an improvement in GDP level for all EU regions (first column of 
Table 14). The trade effects of emissions trading however, are not uniformly distributed  
across EU regions, as expected. Some regions will gain in income from emissions trading 
(Great Britain, Germany, and Czech Republic), while others will lose (Belgium, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Sweden). This means that even though emissions trading will bring 
about substantial efficiency gains for most regions (columns 3 and 4 of Table 14) the 
combined trade and efficiency effects can be negative for some regions, such as Italy (ita) 
and the Netherlands (nld) (see the last column in Table 14). This implies that even though 
the overall welfare effects of emissions trading is postive for all NAP regions as a whole, 
the distribution of these welfare gains may not be uniform across regions, with some 
regions (such as Germany (deu) and France (fra) gaining more  from emissions trade, 
while others (the Netherlands (nld) and Italy (ita)) may lose due to adverse terms of trade 
effects.   14
Conclusion 
Our study has shown that emissions trading is an important policy instrument to use in 
trying to achieve a particular climate policy objective such as in the fulfilment of the 
Kyoto obligations by the EU in their National Allocation Plans (NAPs). The use of this 
‘flexible’ policy instrument is seen to result in significant efficiency gains, measured in 
either terms of the reduction in marginal abatement cost for a particular sector within a 
given region, or in terms of the ‘welfare triangles’ which measure the reductions in total 
compliance costs (for those sectors with high MACs), or the gains in revenue from 
emission trading (for those sectors with low MACs). The efficiency gains result in 
positive increases in real GDP growth for all regions. However, the adverse terms of trade 
effects (which depend to a large extent on the initial distribution of the total ‘burden’ of 
emission reductions across different sectors and different regions) may result in a net 
welfare loss for some regions. This implies net changes in national income maybe 
negative for some region even though changes in real GDP maybe positive. This unveven 
distribution of the total net benefit of emissions trading may call for some attention to be 
paid to the initial distribution of the burden of emissions reductions across regions. 
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Table 4  Percentage change in emissions for period 2005-2007 
in Experiment 1 (No Emissions Trade) 
 
\Sector 




Pcts  Metals 
Min_
Prod  Paper 
Motor
Equip  Constr Textile 
Oth_ 
Ind  ROE 
aut  -5.3  -0.7  -0.4  -8.9 -7.9  -3.5 -4.3 -3.6  -4.9  -4.6  -5.9  0.7  -1.5 
bel  -1.8  -0.8  -1.6  -27.4 -5.3  -5.3 -5.3 -5.3  -5.3  -5.3  -5.3 -5.3 -0.9 
dnk  -2.1  -0.2  -6.9  -26.2 -7.1  -7.1 -7.1 -7.1  -7.1  -7.1  -7.1 -7.1 -0.2 
fin  -7.6  -0.2  -1.2  -12.5  4.1  3.3  1.0  2.1  2.9  0.9  1.7  1.8  0.8 
fra  -3.0  -0.3  -0.2  -0.4 -2.8 -10.3 -8.1  0.3  0.2  -1.0  -0.2  0.2  -0.9 
deu  -3.2  -0.5  -1.0  -3.1 -2.6  -0.5 -0.4 -1.0  -2.2  -2.2  -2.2 -2.2 -1.3 
grc  -5.8  -2.5  -16.1  -6.5 -16.8  -4.9  -2.9  -6.6  -4.5  -4.8  -6.6  -7.0  -5.9 
gbr  -3.6  -0.3  -1.5  -8.7 -0.9 -18.4 -5.7 -3.3  -3.3  -2.9  -2.5  0.0  0.1 
ita  -2.4  -0.2  -0.3  -5.5  0.4  -4.2 -1.7 -3.4  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.1  0.5 
nld  -2.0  -0.3  -0.2  -7.8 -7.8  -7.8 -7.8 -7.8  -7.8  -7.8  -7.8 -7.8  0.0 
prt  -2.3  -0.5  -1.7  -6.2  0.8  0.6  -1.2  0.2  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.1 
esp  -3.6  -0.4  -0.4  -6.5 -3.6  -2.9 -5.4 -4.5  -0.4  -1.4  0.2  -1.7  -1.1 
swe  -5.6  -1.0  -13.9  -13.9 -13.9  -13.9 -13.9 -13.9 -13.9 -13.9  -13.9  -13.9 -2.4 
cze  -3.0  -0.5  0.2  -4.5 -4.3  -4.6 -4.5 -4.1  1.2  -0.8  2.3  1.8  -0.8 
hun  -3.0  -0.4  -0.3  -3.1 -5.1  -5.1 -5.1 -5.1  0.2  -0.4  0.7  0.6  -0.7 




Table 5  Marginal Abatement Cost ($/t CO2)  
in Experiment 1 (No Emissions Trade) 
 
\Sector 




Pcts  Metals 
Min_
Prod  Paper 
Motor
Equip  Constr Textile 
Oth_ 
Ind  ROE 
aut  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.8 42.2  1.6  3.0  1.0  2.0  3.2  2.0  0.0  0.0 
bel  0.0  0.0  0.0  11.5 32.3  1.6  4.4  3.2 5.7 6.4  3.5  7.7  0.0 
dnk  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.5 50.5  0.2  1.1  0.1 0.0 9.4  0.0  0.1  0.0 
fin  0.0  0.0  0.0  8.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
fra  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5 17.3  4.1 11.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
deu  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.6 22.5  0.7  0.5  0.7 1.5 2.4  1.4  1.8  0.0 
grc  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.8 137.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
gbr  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.2 13.3  0.4  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
ita  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.8  0.0  2.1 2.6 1.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
nld  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.8 30.7  1.8  8.7  1.1 0.2 0.0  0.4  13.9  0.0 
prt  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  1.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
esp  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.3 19.2  1.3  6.8  3.4 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
swe  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.1 163.1  10.7  16.2  15.0 13.4 26.9  18.7 8.8 0.0 
cze  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.1 53.8  1.3  2.5  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
hun  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0 28.6  1.9  3.9  1.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
pol  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.3 45.8  2.9  1.3  2.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
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Table 6  Percentage change in emissions for period 2005-2007 
in Experiment 2 (Domestic Emissions Trade) 
 
\Sector 




Pcts  Metals 
Min_
Prod  Paper 
Motor
Equip  Constr Textile 
Oth_ 
Ind  ROE 
 
Total 
aut  -5.3  -0.7  -0.4  -8.9 -7.9  -3.5  -4.3  -3.6  -4.9  -4.6  -5.9  0.7  -1.5  -4.3 
bel  -1.8  -0.8  -1.6  -27.4 -5.3  -5.3  -5.3  -5.3  -5.3  -5.3  -5.3  -5.3  -0.9  -8.5 
dnk  -2.1  -0.2  -6.9  -26.2 -7.1  -7.1  -7.1  -7.1  -7.1  -7.1  -7.1  -7.1  -0.2  -15.1 
fin  -7.6  -0.2  -1.2  -12.5  4.1  3.3  1.0  2.1  2.9  0.9  1.7  1.8  0.8  -6.2 
fra  -3.0  -0.3  -0.2  -0.4 -2.8  -10.3  -8.1  0.3  0.2  -1.0  -0.2  0.2  -0.9  -1.5 
deu  -3.2  -0.5  -1.0  -3.1 -2.6  -0.5  -0.4  -1.0  -2.2  -2.2  -2.2  -2.2  -1.3  -1.8 
grc  -5.8  -2.5  -16.1  -6.5 -16.8  -4.9  -2.9  -6.6  -4.5  -4.8  -6.6  -7.0  -5.9  -3.4 
gbr  -3.6  -0.3  -1.5  -8.7 -0.9  -18.4  -5.7  -3.3  -3.3  -2.9  -2.5  0.0  0.1  -5.0 
ita  -2.4  -0.2  -0.3  -5.5  0.4  -4.2 -1.7 -3.4  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.1  0.5  -2.5 
nld  -2.0  -0.3  -0.2  -7.8 -7.8  -7.8  -7.8  -7.8  -7.8  -7.8  -7.8  -7.8  0.0  -3.7 
prt  -2.3  -0.5  -1.7  -6.2  0.8  0.6  -1.2  0.2  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.1  -2.5 
esp  -3.6  -0.4  -0.4  -6.5 -3.6  -2.9  -5.4  -4.5  -0.4  -1.4  0.2  -1.7  -1.1  -3.2 
swe  -5.6  -1.0  -13.9  -13.9 -13.9  -13.9  -13.9  -13.9 -13.9 -13.9  -13.9  -13.9 -2.4  -6.3 
cze  -3.0  -0.5  0.2  -4.5 -4.3  -4.6  -4.5  -4.1  1.2  -0.8  2.3  1.8  -0.8  -3.5 
hun  -3.0  -0.4  -0.3  -3.1 -5.1  -5.1  -5.1  -5.1  0.2  -0.4  0.7  0.6  -0.7  -2.4 




Table 7  Marginal Abatement Cost ($/t CO2)  
in Experiment 2 (Domestic Emissions Trade) 
 
\Sector 




Pcts  Metals 
Min_
Prod  Paper 
Motor
Equip  Constr Textile 
Oth_ 
Ind  ROE 
aut  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.7 3.7  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.7  0.0  0.0 
bel  0.0  0.0  0.0  8.0 8.0  8.0  8.0  8.0 8.0 8.0  8.0  8.0  0.0 
dnk  0.0  0.0  0.0  6.1 6.1  6.1  6.1  6.1 6.1 6.1  6.1  6.1  0.0 
fin  0.0  0.0  0.0  8.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
fra  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
deu  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5 1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5 1.5 1.5  1.5  1.5  0.0 
grc  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.5 3.5  0.0  0.0  3.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
gbr  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8 0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.0  0.0 
ita  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.6  0.0  2.6 2.6 2.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
nld  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.5 3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5 3.5 3.5  3.5  3.5  0.0 
prt  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
esp  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.8 2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
swe  0.0  0.0  0.0  8.4 8.4  8.4  8.4  8.4 8.4 8.4  8.4  8.4  0.0 
cze  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.2 1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
hun  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3 1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
pol  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.2 2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
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Table 8  Change in emissions (Million tons of CO2) when moving from “No Trade” 






Pcts  Metals 
Min_
Prod  Paper 
Motor
Equip  Constr Textile 
Oth_ 
Ind 
aut  0.02 0.16  -0.18 0.08 -0.06 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
bel  1.85 0.18  -1.71  -0.25 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01  -0.02 0.00 
dnk  1.48 0.07  -0.18  -0.34 -0.17 -0.21  0.02  -0.07  -0.60 
fin  0.00 -0.06  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
fra  -2.76 0.41  0.95 1.39 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.01  0.03 
deu  0.56 0.54  -0.67  -0.52 -0.10 0.06 0.04  0.01  0.08 
grc  -0.46 0.44  0.11 0.32 0.02 0.01 0.02  0.03  0.10 
gbr  11.68 0.18  -1.42  -2.44 -2.80 -3.76 -0.16  -1.29 0.04 
ita  0.42 -0.13  -0.21 -0.08 -0.12 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
nld  0.23 0.92  -0.51 0.57 -0.15 -0.75 -0.17  -0.16 0.03 
prt  0.03 -0.03  0.00 -0.03  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
esp  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
swe  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
cze  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
hun  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
pol  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
Table 9  Efficiency gains ($ millions) when moving from “No Trade”(Experiment 1) 






Pcts  Metals 
Min_
Prod  Paper 
Motor




aut  0.0 3.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  3.7 
bel  3.3 2.2  5.4  0.4  0.1  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  11.5 
dnk  1.1 1.6  0.5  0.8  0.5  0.6 0.0  0.2  1.8  7.5 
fin  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
fra  2.2 3.1  1.0  6.6  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  12.9 
deu  0.0 5.7  0.3  0.3  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  6.3 
grc  0.2 29.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  29.8 
gbr  8.2 1.2  0.3  0.6  1.0  1.4 0.0  0.5  0.0  13.1 
ita  0.0 0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2 
nld  0.0 12.4  0.5  1.5  0.2  1.3 0.3  0.3  0.1  16.5 
prt  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
esp  0.2 3.1  0.2  1.5  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  5.0 
swe  1.2 13.3  0.2  0.6  0.5  0.1 0.5  0.1  0.0  16.4 
cze  0.0 0.9  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0 
hun  0.0 1.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  1.2 
pol  0.0 1.8  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  2.2 
(*) Efficiency gain is calculated as -0.5 x (Change in emissions) x (Change in MAC), where 
the changes will be opposite in directions(except where output effect dominates substitution 
effect). 
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Table 10  Percentage change in emissions for period 2005-2007 
in Experiment 3 (Regional Emissions Trade) 
 
\Sector 








Equip Constr Textile 
Oth_ 
Ind ROE  Total 
aut  -3.9 -0.1 -0.3  -4.0 -0.6  -3.9  -1.7 -5.0 -3.2 -1.9  -3.7  0.8 0.3  -2.0 
bel  -2.1 0.0  -1.1  -5.9  -0.3  -6.6 -2.1 -3.5 -1.8 -1.7  -3.3 -1.3 0.1  -2.4 
dnk  -1.9 0.0  -3.1  -7.0  -0.3 -41.9  -10.0  -74.6 -53.4  -1.4  -72.5 -65.4  0.6  -6.2 
fin  -2.9 0.0  -0.5  -2.8 0.2  1.8  0.6 1.0 0.8 0.3  0.7 0.6  0.2  -1.2 
fra  -2.2  0.0  -0.2  -7.0  -0.5 -4.9  -1.4 0.5 0.4 0.0  0.2 0.6  0.0  -1.6 
deu  -4.4 0.0  -0.7  -4.4  -0.3  -3.9 -2.5 -3.3 -2.0 -1.3  -2.5 -0.9 0.1  -2.7 
grc  -4.4 -0.2 -0.9  -4.4 -0.4  1.3  1.3  -0.9  1.3  0.0  0.4  0.3  0.1  -1.9 
gbr  -3.7 0.0  -1.4  -8.2  -0.2 -36.9  -30.4  -73.6 -70.8 -10.6  -72.9  0.5  0.5  -8.7 
ita  -2.2 0.0  -0.2 -4.0  -0.3  -4.2 -1.5 -4.6  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.8 0.3  -1.9 
nld  -1.7 0.0  -0.2 -4.2  -0.5  -9.2 -1.6  -14.9  -53.9  -30.9  -34.1 -1.1 0.2  -2.2 
prt  -2.3  0.0  -1.7  -6.3  -0.3  0.6  -1.9 0.2 0.4 0.1  0.1 0.4  0.1  -2.6 
esp  -3.2 0.0  -0.2 -5.7  -0.5  -4.2 -1.4 -2.4  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.1 0.0  -2.4 
swe  -2.6 -0.1 -3.9  -5.4 -0.2  -2.1  -1.4  -1.5 -1.9 -1.0  -1.4 -2.4 0.1  -1.6 
cze  -4.0 0.1 0.4  -10.6  -0.3  -7.4 -2.7 -4.9  3.0  0.6  3.7  2.4 1.0  -7.4 
hun  -4.0 0.0  -0.4 -6.6  -1.0  -5.2 -2.4 -4.9  1.3  0.8  1.3  0.5 0.6  -3.9 




Table 11  Marginal Abatement Cost ($/t CO2)  
in Experiment 3 (Regional Emissions Trade) 
 
\Sector 




Pcts  Metals 
Min_
Prod  Paper 
Motor
Equip  Constr Textile 
Oth_ 
Ind  ROE 
aut  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  0.0  0.0 
bel  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0 2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  0.0 
dnk  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0 2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  0.0 
fin  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
fra  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
deu  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0 2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  0.0 
grc  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0 2.0  0.0  0.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
gbr  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  0.0  0.0 
ita  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0  0.0  2.0 2.0 2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
nld  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0 2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  0.0 
prt  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
esp  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
swe  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0 2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  0.0 
cze  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
hun  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
pol  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
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Table 12  Change in emissions (Million tons of CO2) when moving from “Domestic Emissions 






Pcts  Metals 
Min_
Prod  Paper 
Motor
Equip  Constr Textile 
Oth_ 
Ind 
aut  0.8 0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
bel  4.2 0.1  1.6  0.5  0.0 0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0 
dnk  5.3 0.0  0.1  0.2  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.1 
fin  2.8 0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
fra  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
deu  -4.9 0.0  -0.4 -0.3 -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
grc  1.2 0.0  0.0 -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
gbr  -10.8 0.0  -1.6 -3.9 -0.3  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1  0.0 
ita  1.6 0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
nld  2.0 0.1  0.4  0.2  0.1 0.2 0.0  0.1  0.0 
prt  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
esp  1.5 0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
swe  1.6 0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
cze  -3.6 0.0  -0.5 -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
hun  -0.7 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
pol  1.2 0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
 
 
Table 13  Efficiency gains ($ millions) when moving from “Domestic Emissions Trade”  















aut  0.7 0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0 
bel  12.6 0.2  4.7  1.6  0.1 0.2 0.2  0.1  0.1  19.8 
dnk  10.7 0.0  0.1  0.5  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.2  11.7 
fin  8.4 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  8.4 
fra  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
deu  1.3 0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5 
grc  0.9 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9 
gbr  6.9 0.0  1.0  2.5  0.2 0.2 0.1  0.1  0.0  10.9 
ita  0.5 0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6 
nld  1.5 0.1  0.3  0.2  0.1 0.1 0.0  0.0  0.0  2.2 
prt  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
esp  0.6 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7 
swe  5.3 0.1  0.7  0.3  0.3 0.1 0.1  0.0  0.1  6.9 
cze  1.5 0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  1.8 
hun  0.2 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3 
pol  0.1 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 
(*)Efficiency  gain is calculated as -0.5 x (Change in emissions) x (Change in MAC), where 
the changes will be opposite in directions(except where output effect dominates substitution 
effect). 
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Table 14 Macroeconomic effects of Domestic and Regional Emission Trading(*) 
Welfare Decomposition: 
Equivalent Variation (EV)  


















Terms of Trade 
effects  Total(**) 
aut  0.10  -2.4  10.5 181.7 -20.4 171.9 
bel  0.11 -13.4  43.2 209.5  -127.7 125.2 
dnk  0.12 -11.7  33.8 163.8 -10.0 187.1 
fin  0.04 -5.7 14.2 35.2 -7.7 37.9 
fra  0.05  0.0  31.9 660.2 -85.3 606.0 
deu  0.06 11.6 39.7  1155.7  118.0  1312.4 
grc  0.33  -2.4  30.6 357.2 -99.5 286.1 
gbr  0.02  34.6  -7.7 249.4  14.4 259.1 
ita  0.00  -4.1  3.5 -40.8 -13.1 -49.8 
nld  0.05 -5.9 21.8  183.5  -377.2  -171.8 
prt  0.00 0.1 0.6 1.1 9.2  10.2 
esp  0.06  -3.7  9.1 334.6 -68.7 275.9 
swe  0.13  -4.4  28.3 264.0  -122.2 174.1 
cze  0.05  8.5 -4.3 31.3 -6.9 19.4 
hun  0.10 1.5 3.0  49.7  -5.6  47.0 
pol  0.02 -2.7  6.9 30.3 11.9 50.1 
(*) The values shown in this Table are changes from Experiment 1 (No Emissions Trading) to Experiment 3 (Regional 
Emission Trading). 
(**) Including a small effect due to changes in the price of capital goods. 
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